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Abstract: We present a partial operator-theoretic characterization of approachability principle
and based on this characterization, we interpret a particular distributed payoff allocation algo-
rithm to be a sequence of time varying paracontractions. Further, we also propose a distributed
algorithm, under the context of coalitional game, on time-varying communication network. The
state in the proposed algorithm converges to a consensus within, the predefined, desired set. For
convergence analysis, we rely on the operator-theoretic property of paracontraction.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Coalitional game theory provides an analytical framework
and mathematical formalism, to study the behavior of
selfish and rational agents, when they are willing to co-
operate. Interestingly, this scenario arises in many appli-
cations, such as demand side energy management [Han
et al. (2018)], in power networks for transmission cost
allocation [Zolezzi and Rudnick (2002)] and cooperation
between microgrids in distribution networks [Saad et al.
(2011)], in various areas of communication networks by
[Saad et al. (2009)], [Saad et al. (2008)] and as conceptual
foundation for coalitional control [Fele et al. (2017)].
Specifically, a coalitional game with transferable utility
consists of a set of agents referred as players, who can form
coalitions, and a characteristic function that determines
the value of each coalition. Note that a selfish agent will
cooperate with other agents only if this coalition results
in increasing its own benefit. The latter is determined
by the payoff the agent receives from the value generated
by a coalition. The design of criteria for determining this
payoff has received acute attention by research community,
such as Scarf (1967), Shapley (1953), Schmeidler (1969),
Maschler et al. (1971). The solutions proposed determine
the stability of a coalition, i.e., whether the coalition re-
mains intact or gets defected by its agents. One of the
most widely studied solution concepts is the CORE which
ensures the stability of a game.
The problem we address in this paper is finding a payoff
that belongs to CORE and hence encourages cooperation.
Our practical treatment of this problem is in a multi-
agent scenario, where players interact autonomously and
in distributed manner to arrive at common agreement on
a payoff vector in the CORE. In this direction, Lehrer
(2003) presented an allocation process which converges
to the CORE (or if this is empty, to a least-CORE).
Smyrnakis et al. (2019) also consider an allocation process
but under noisy observations and dynamic environment.
Bauso et al. (2014) provide conditions for an averaging
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process, with dynamics subject to controls and adversar-
ial disturbances, under which the allocations converge to
consensus in the desired set. Nedich and Bauso (2013)
propose an elegant distributed bargaining algorithm which
converges to a random CORE payoff allocation. The key
inspiration, however, of our work is the distributed payoff
allocation algorithm proposed by Bauso and Notarstefano
(2015). Their algorithm is based on the approachability
principle, which is a geometric condition introduced in
Blackwell’s approachability Theorem [Blackwell (1954)].
The approachability principle provides a way to approach
a particular set and hence can be exploited to reach the
CORE in the context of coalitional game theory.
Contribution: In this paper, we first show that the ap-
proachability condition contains a paracontraction oper-
ator. Briefly, an operator T : Rn → Rn is said to be
a paracontraction if, for any fixed point y = T (y) and
x ∈ Rn, where x 6= y, it holds that ‖T (x) − y‖ < ‖x −
y‖. These operators form the subclass of, perhaps more
known, quasi-non-expansive mappings [Ernest Ryu and
Boyd (2016)].
Secondly, we propose a distributed payoff allocation al-
gorithm, in context of coalitional games over time-varying
communication networks. The state of proposed algorithm
converges to a consensus vector that belongs to the CORE.
Our approach to prove convergence of our algorithm relies
on the paracontraction property of the adopted operator.
Organization of the paper : In Section 2, we provide the
mathematical background for coalitional games and dis-
tributed allocation process. In Section 3, we discuss the
approachability principle and recall the distributed payoff
allocation algorithm by Bauso and Notarstefano (2015).
In Section 4, we provide a partial operator-theoretic char-
acterization of the approachability principle, and we dis-
cuss algorithm in [Bauso and Notarstefano (2015)]. In
Section 5, we propose an algorithm for distributed allo-
cation in coalitional games and establish its convergence
using operator-theoretic properties. Further, we asses the
convergence speed of proposed algorithm in Section 6, and
in Section 7, we conclude the paper.
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Notation: R and N denote the set of real and natural
numbers, respectively. Given a mapping M : Rn →
Rn,fix(M) := {x ∈ Rn | x = M(x)} denote the set of
fixed points. Id denotes the identity operator. For a closed
set S ⊆ Rn, the mapping projS : Rn → S denotes the
projection onto S, i.e., projS(x) = arg miny∈S ‖y − x‖.
A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product between the matrices
A and B. IN denotes an identity matrix of dimension
N ×N . dist(x, S) denotes the distance of x from a closed
set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., dist(x, S) := infy∈S‖y − x‖.
2. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND ON
COALITIONAL GAMES
A coalitional game consists of a set of agents, indexed by
I = {1, . . . , N}, who cooperate to achieve selfish interests.
This cooperation results in generation of utility as defined
by the characteristic function v. Formally,
Definition 1. (Coalitional game): A transferable utility
(TU) coalitional game is a pair G = (I, v), where I =
{1, . . . , N} is the index set of the agents and v : 2N → R
is a characteristic function which assigns a real value, v(S),
to each coalition S ⊆ I. v(I) is the value of so-called grand
coalition. By convention, v(0) = ∅. 
The idea of coalitional game is that the value attained by
a coalition S, i.e. ,v(S) has to be distributed among the
members of the coalition, thus each agent receives a certain
payoff.
Definition 2. (Payoff vector): Let S ⊆ I be a coalition
of coalitional game (I, v). A payoff vector is a vector
x ∈ R|S|. Where xi represents the share of agent i ∈ S
of v(S). 
Let us state two important characteristics of a payoff
vector which will further help us in explaining the solution
concept of a coalitional game. First, for a game with a
grand coalition I, a payoff vector x ∈ RN is said to be
efficient if
∑
i∈I xi = v(I). In words, all of the value
generated by grand coalition will be distributed among
the agents. Second, a payoff vector is rational if for every
possible coalition S ⊆ I we have ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S). Note
that this should also hold for singleton coalitions S = {i}
i.e. xi ≥ v(i),∀i ∈ I. It means that, payoff allocated to
each agent should be at least equal to what they can get
individually or by forming any coalition S other than I.
A payoff vector which is both efficient and rational lies
in the CORE. CORE is the solution concept that relates
with the stability of a grand coalition. Where, the idea
of stability, in this context, is based on the disinterest of
agents in defecting a grand coalition. Formally,
Definition 3. (CORE): The CORE C of a coalitional game
(I, v) is the following set of payoff vectors:
C :=
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈I
xi = v(I),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S),∀S ⊆ I
}
.
(1)

Each payoff allocation that belongs to CORE stabilizes
the grand coalition. It implies that no agent or coalition
S ⊂ I has an incentive to defect from the grand coalition.
In the sequel, we deal with the grand coalition only, there-
fore we use the CORE C as the solution concept. Note
Fig. 1. Geometric interpretation of the approachability
principle.
from (1) that C is closed and convex. We also assume the
CORE to be non-empty through out the paper. Next, we
discuss a possible strategy of finding the payoff vector, in
a coalitional game G = (I, v), that belongs to CORE, C
in (1). Centralized methods for finding a vector x ∈ C
do not capture realistic scenarios of interaction among
autonomous selfish agents. Thus, distributed methods are
employed that allow agents to autonomously reach a com-
mon agreement on a payoff allocation, x ∈ C.
Generally, the distributed allocation is an iterative pro-
cedure in which, at each step, an agent i proposes a
utility distribution xi ∈ RN by averaging the proposals
of all agents and introducing an innovation factor. This
procedure aspires to finally reach at a mutually agreed pay-
off among participating agents. Eventually the proposed
utility distributions {xi}i∈I must reach consensus.
Definition 4. (Consensus set): The consensus setA ⊂ RN2
is defined as:
A := {x = col(x1, . . . ,xN ) ∈ RN2 | xi = xj ,∀i, j ∈ I}.
(2)

Therefore, in this paper, we consider the problem of
computing a mutually agreed, payoff allocation vector in
the CORE, i.e., x¯ ∈ A ∩ C, via a iterative distributed
allocation, i.e., x(k)→ x¯ as k →∞.
3. APPROACHABILITY PRINCIPLE AND
DISTRIBUTED PAYOFF ALLOCATION
3.1 Approachability principle
We now discuss a geometric principle which can guarantee
the convergence of a payoff allocation sequence to a target
set, which in our coalitional game theory context, is
the CORE C, as in (1).This principle, which we refer
to as approachability principle, is the geometric concept
behind celebrated approachability theorem by Blackwell
presented in [Blackwell (1954)].
Definition 5. (Approachability Principle)[Lehrer (2003),
3.2], Let (yk)k∈N be a sequence of uniformly bounded
vectors in Rn, with running average y¯k := 1k
∑k
k′=1 yk′ ,
and let C be a non-empty, closed and convex set. If the
sequence satisfies the condition,
(y¯k − projC(y¯k))>(yk+1 − projC(y¯k)) ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ N, (3)
then lim
k→∞
dist(y¯k, C) = 0. 
In Figure 1, we illustrate the approachability condition in
(3). Let us give a geometric interpretation: the hyperplane
through the point projC(y¯k), perpendicular to the vector
(y¯k − projC(y¯k)), which is the first term in (3), separates
the space into the half-spaces H+ and H−. The the ap-
proachability condition requires that, the innovation yk+1
and the average y¯k should not lie in the same half-space.
Among others, Bauso and Notarstefano (2015) have used
the approachability principle to design a distributed payoff
allocation algorithm which converges to a consensus vector
in the CORE in (1). Let us recall their setup and solution
algorithm in next subsection.
3.2 A time-varying Distributed payoff allocation process
Consider a set of agents I = {1, . . . , N} who syn-
chronously propose a distribution of utility at each discrete
time step k ∈ N. Specifically, each agent i ∈ I proposes
a payoff distribution xˆi(k) ∈ RN , where the jth element
denotes the share of agent j proposed by agent i. Then,
each agent i computes xˆi by averaging the proposals by his
neighboring agents and then by generating an innovation
vector x as follows:
xˆ(k + 1) = (1− αk)Akxˆ(k) + αkx(k + 1), ∀k ∈ N, (4)
where (αk)k∈N is a positive sequence of step sizes, with
αk :=
1
k+1 , and Ak := A(k)⊗ IN represents an adjacency
matrix.
Now, Let the communication graph vary over time as
G(k) = (I, E(k)). Specifically, (j, i) ∈ E(k) means that
there is an active link between agents i and j at time k. In
[Bauso and Notarstefano (2015), Assumption 2], the graph
sequence (G(k))k∈N is assumed to be Q−connected.
Assumption 1. There exists an integer Q ≥ 1 such that
the graph (I,∪Ql=1E(l + k)) is strongly connected, for all
k ≥ 0. 
The communication links in G(k) are weighted using an
adjacency matrix A(k) = [ai,j(k)]N×N , whose element ai,j
represents the weight assigned by agent i to the payoff
distribution proposed by agent j, xˆj(k). By [Bauso and
Notarstefano (2015), Assumption 1], the adjacency matrix
is always doubly stochastic with positive diagonal.
Assumption 2. For all k ≥ 0, the matrix A(k) =
[ai,j(k)]N×N satisfies following conditions:
(i) It is doubly stochastic;
(ii) its diagonal elements are strictly positive, i.e.,
ai,i(k) > 0,∀i ∈ I;
(iii) ∃ γ > 0 such that ai,j(k) ≥ γ whenever ai,j(k) > 0.

Furthermore, at each time k, the agents generate an
innovation vector x(k) in (4), satisfying approachability
condition, as formulated in (3). Specifically, let w(k) :=
Akxˆ(k), with xˆ(k) as in (4), then following is postulated
in [Bauso and Notarstefano (2015), Assumption 4]:
Assumption 3. For each k ∈ N, the innovation vector
x(k + 1) in (4) satisfies the following inequality:
(w(k)− projC(w(k)))> (x(k + 1)− projC(w(k))) ≤ 0,
(5)
where C is the CORE set as in (1). 
Moreover, to fulfil the conditions of the approachability
principle, the innovation vector is uniformly bounded,
[Bauso and Notarstefano (2015), Assumption 4].
Assumption 4. Let x(k + 1) be innovation vector in (4).
There exist L > 0, such that ‖xi(k + 1)‖ ≤ L,∀k ≥ 0.
The main result regarding the iteration in (4) by Bauso
and Notarstefano (2015) is that, if Assumptions 1−4 hold
then the average allocation vector xˆ(k) will converge to
the set A ∩ C. In the context of coalitional game theory,
this implies that through the distributed allocation process
in (4), the agents will reach a common agreement on the
payoff distribution, which lies in the CORE.
4. OPERATOR THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION
4.1 Approachability principle as a paracontraction
In this subsection, we aim at providing an operator-
theoretic characterization of the approachability condition
in (5), and present an interesting operator contained by
approachability condition which holds a paracontraction
property. To show that, we first define the notion of
paracontraction.
Definition 6. (Paracontraction): A continuous mapping
M : Rn → Rn is a paracontraction, with respect to a
norm ‖ · ‖ on Rn, if
‖M(x)− y‖ < ‖x− y‖,
for all x, y ∈ Rn such that x /∈ fix(M), y ∈ fix(M). 
The approachability condition in (5), given w(k) =
Akxˆ(k) provides us the criterion for generating an inno-
vation vector x(k + 1) to be used in the iterative process
in (4). In the next statement, we will present an alterna-
tive formulation for the approachability condition which,
interestingly, is the sum of a paracontracting operator and
arbitrary vectors with specific geometric meaning.
Lemma 1. Let β ∈ [0, 1), QC := 2projC − Id be the over-
projection operator, v⊥(k) = v⊥(wi(k)) be an arbitrary
vector that belongs to the hyperplane orthogonal to the
vector u := (wi(k) − projC(wi(k))) in (5) and v−(k) =
v−(wi(k)) be a vector orthogonal to v⊥(k) in the direction
opposite to vector u, (Figure 2). Then, the following equa-
tion corresponds exactly to the approachability condition
in (5):
xi(k + 1) = (1− β)projC(wi(k))+ βQC(wi(k))
+v⊥(k) + v−(k). 
(6)
In Figure 2, we geometrically illustrate Equation (6) for
some β ∈ (1/2, 1).
Proof. To show that (6) corresponds to the approacha-
bility condition, let us plug (6) into (5). In the remainder
of the proof, we drop the dependence on k for ease of
notation.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Illustration of the approachability condition as
in Equation (6): projection and over-projection (a);
innovation x+i (b).
(wi − proj(wi))>︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
( x+︸︷︷︸
(6)
−proj(wi)) ≤ 0
⇔ (u)>((1− β)projC(wi) + β QC(wi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2projC(wi)−wi
+v⊥ + v− − proj(wi)) ≤ 0
⇔ (u)>(β(−u) + v⊥ + v−) ≤ 0
⇔ −β(u)>(u) + (u)>v⊥︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+(u)>v− ≤ 0
⇔ −β‖u‖2 − |u| |v−| ≤ 0,
Since all the steps are equivalent and the vectors v⊥ and
v− can be chosen arbitrarily for each given wi(k), and
since any point in H− can be written in the form in (6),
we conclude that (6) is equivalent to the approachability
condition in (5). 
Let us now consider the particular case of (6) with v⊥ =
v− = 0, and define the dependence of x(k+ 1) from w(k)
via an operator T :
∀i ∈ I : x+i = (1− β)projC(wi) + βQC(wi)
= ((1− β)projC + βQC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ti
(wi)
= Ti(wi).
(7)
The operator Ti := (1 − β)projC(·) + βQC(·) in (7) is
a mapping from w(k) to x(k + 1) which, by Lemma 1,
satisfies the approachability condition in (5). Using this
operator Ti, we can give the following representation to
the process of generation of an innovation vector x(k+ 1)
in (4), which is equivalent to the particular case in (7) of
the approachability condition.
x(k + 1) = T (w(k)) =
 T1(w1(k))...
TN (wN (k))
 . (8)
Next, we present an operator-theoretic property of the
operator T in the following statement.
Theorem 1. The operator T : Rn → Rn defined in (7)−(8)
is a paracontraction. 
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 1, we provide two
technical statements, which we exploit later in the proof.
Lemma 2. (Projection and Over-projection operators):
Let C ⊂ Rn be a non-empty, closed and convex set. Then,
with respect to the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖2:
(i) the projection operator projC is a paracontraction;
(ii) the over projection operator, QC := 2projC − Id, is
non-expansive. 
Proof. (i): If C is closed and convex then projC is a
paracontraction, [Elsner et al. (1992), Example 2].
(ii): By [Ernest Ryu and Boyd (2016), Subsection 3.1]. 
Lemma 3. Let M be a paracontraction, B be a non-
expansive operator, with fix(M) ∩ fix(B) 6= ∅ and α ∈
(0, 1). Then, C := (1−α)M +αB is a paracontraction. 
Proof. Let y ∈ fix(M) ∩ fix(B) and x 6= y. Then:
‖C(x)− C(y)‖ = ‖((1− α)M + αB)x
− ((1− α)M + αB)y‖
= ‖(1− α)(Mx−My) + α(Bx−By)‖
≤ (1− α)‖Mx− y‖+ α‖(Bx− y)‖
< (1− α)‖x− y‖+ α‖(x− y)‖
= ‖x− y‖,
where we have used the triangular inequality and then
the definition of paracontraction for M . Therefore, with
‖C(x) − C(y)‖ < ‖x − y‖, we obtain the definition of
paracontraction. 
Remark 1. Lemma 3 also holds if both operators are
paracontractions (with the same proof). 
Given these results, we are now ready to present the proof
of Theorem 1.
Proof. (Theorem 1): At each time k an agent i generates
an innovation vector xi(k + 1) in (4), satisfying the
restricted approachability condition in (7). By Lemma
2, the operator T in (8) is a convex combination of a
paracontraction, projC(·) and a non-expansive operator,
QC(·). Thus, by Lemma 3, it is a paracontraction. 
4.2 Distributed allocation process as a sequence of time
varying paracontractions
The result in Theorem 1 further allows us to characterize
an operator-theoretic property of the iteration in (4).
We show that, under a particular case of approachability
condition in (7), the iteration generates a sequence of
time varying paracontractions. To prove this, we recall two
useful results related to paracontractions.
Proposition 1. (Composition of paracontracting opera-
tors): Suppose M1,M2 : Rn → Rn are paracontractions
with respect to same norm ‖ · ‖ and fix(M1)∩fix(M2) 6= ∅.
Then the composition M1 ◦M2 is a paracontraction with
respect to the norm ‖ · ‖ and fix(M1 ◦M2) = fix(M1) ∩
fix(M2), [Fullmer and Morse (2018), Prop. 1]. 
Proposition 2. (Doubly stochastic matrix): Let A be a
doubly stochastic matrix with strictly positive diagonal
elements. Then, the linear operator defined by the matrix
A⊗In is a paracontraction with respect to the mixed vector
norm ‖ · ‖2,2, [Fullmer and Morse (2018), Prop. 5]. 
Using the operator T in (8) and w(k) = Akxˆ(k) as in (5),
we can rewrite (4) as:
w(k + 1) = (1− αk)Akw(k) + αkAkT (w(k)), ∀k ∈ N.
(9)
Note that, the step-size sequence (αk)k∈N in (4) is specified
to be αk =
1
k+1 by Bauso and Notarstefano (2015). Here,
we can generalize it subject to the following assumption.
Assumption 5. Let (αk)k>0 be a sequence such that αk ∈
(0, 1),∀k ≥ 0, ∑∞k=0 αk =∞, and ∑∞k=0 α2k <∞. 
Let us also define an operator Sk := (1 − αk)Ak(·) +
αkAkT (·), which in turn allows us to represent the it-
eration in (9) more concisely as:
w(k + 1) = Sk(w(k)). (10)
With the latter formulation, we can now conveniently
characterize the paracontraction property of the operator
Sk, according to the corollary below.
Corollary 1. Let the operator T : Rn → Rn be as in
(8). Then, for each k ∈ N, the operator Sk in (10) is a
paracontraction. 
Proof. By Theorem 1, the operator T is a paracontrac-
tion. Furthermore, by Proposition 1 and 2, the composi-
tion Ak ◦ T (·) is also a paracontraction. This fact and
Proposition 2 imply that for each k ∈ N the operator
Sk := (1− αk)Ak(·) + αkAkT (·) is a convex combination
of paracontractions and hence, by Remark 1 on Lemma 3,
is a paracontraction. 
Remark 2. Corollary 1 also holds if, for all k ∈ N, αk =
α ∈ (0, 1) in (9). 
The results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 provide an
interesting operator-theoretic insight into the structure of
algorithm presented by Bauso and Notarstefano (2015).
We use this insight to design our own distributed payoff
allocation algorithm, which we present in the next section
along with its convergence proof.
5. DISTRIBUTED ALLOCATION VIA
PARACONTRACTION OPERATORS OVER
TIME-VARYING NETWORKS
In this section, we present our distributed allocation algo-
rithm and exploit the results derived in Section 4 to prove
its convergence. The algorithm we propose is similar, in
structure, to iteration presented in (9), so the same defini-
tions hold except for the step size α, which is considered
to be fixed here. In fact, the paracontraction property of
the employed operator in proposed algorithm, allows us
to prove the convergence, even with the fixed α. Further,
we will show in Section 6 via numerical simulations that
the algorithm actually performs faster with an appropriate
choice of fixed step size α.
Let the elements of the iteration, i.e., the set of agents
I, the operator T , the vector w(k) and the matrix Ak =
A(k)⊗IN be as in (9), defined in Subsection 3.2. Then, the
distributed allocation procedure on time varying networks,
takes the form:
w(k+1) = (1−α)Akw(k)+αAkT (w(k)), ∀k ∈ N. (11)
Note that, in our proposed iteration in (11), there are two
differences compared to (9). First, the step size α is fixed
and secondly the elements of communication matrix A(k)
can take values from finite set. The latter implies that
there are finite number of adjacency matrices available,
for the communication among agents. Formally,
Assumption 6. Each element of communication matrix
Ak, i.e., ai,j(k),∀(i, j) ∈ I, can take the values in a finite
set. 
We can also redefine the operator S in (10) with fixed α
as Sk := (1−α)Ak(·) +αAkT (·) to write (11) in compact
form as:
w(k + 1) = Sk(w(k)), ∀k ∈ N. (12)
Note that, because of fixed step size α in (11) and
Assumption 6, the operator sequence (Sk)k∈N will belong
to a finite family of paracontractions. This will allow us
to exploit the following well-known theorem, proved by
Elsner et al. (1992), later for our convergence result.
Lemma 4. (Elsner et al. (1992)) Let M be a finite family
of paracontractions such that
⋂
M∈M fix(M) 6= ∅, and
consider the iteration
x(k + 1) = Mk(x(k)),
where, for each k ∈ N,Mk ∈ M. Then, the state x(k)
converges to a common fixed point of the paracontractions
that occur infinitely often in the sequence. 
We now have the necessary tools and algorithmic setup to
show, in the following theorem, that iteration in (11)−(12)
converges to a consensus vector, see A in (2) which belongs
to CORE, C in (1).
Theorem 2. Let α ∈ (0, 1] and the operator T : Rn →
Rn be a paracontraction with fix(T ) = C in (1). Let
Assumptions 1− 3 and 6 hold. Then, the iteration in (12)
is such that:
(i) (Sk)k∈N is a sequence of time-varying paracontrac-
tions;
(ii) fix(Sk) = C ∩ A,∀k ∈ N;
(iii) lim
k→∞
wk = w
∗ for some w∗ ∈ C ∩ A,
where C is the CORE set (1) and A is the consensus set
(2). 
Proof. (i): It follows directly from Remark 2 on Corollary
1.
(ii): To characterise the fixed points of Sk in (12), let
y ∈ fix(Sk) i.e. y = (1 − α)Aky + αAkT (y). And let
w¯ ∈ fix(T ) ∩ A. Here, we want to show that y = w¯.
It follows by Perron-Frobenius theorem that fix(Ak) = A,
regardless of the temporal variation in Ak. So, w¯ ∈ A ⇒
w¯ = Ak ◦ T (w¯). Consequently, y = (1 − α)Akw¯ +
αAkT (w¯)⇒ y = w¯. And, as fix(T ) = C, hence fix(Sk) =
C ∩ A, which concludes the proof of this assertion.
(iii): It follows from assertion (i), (ii), Assumption 6 and
direct application of Lemma 4. 
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. (a): The trajectories of dist(w(k), C ∩
A)/dist(w(0), C ∩ A) with α = 1/(k + 1) for β =
1/5, 4/5 and α = 1/2 for β = 1/5, 4/5. (b): The
trajectories of dist(w(k), C ∩ A)/dist(w(0), C ∩ A)
with α = 1/4, α = 1/2, α = 3/4 and α = 1/(k + 1).
This result shows a remarkable ability of operator-
theoretic tools to describe algorithms in general form.
For instance, our algorithm in (10) allows a mechanism
designer to choose an operator T in (11) of his choice to
possibly steer the consensus towards a particular point in
set C in (1). This operator is primarily required to fulfill
two necessary requirements: it should be a paracontraction
and fix(T ) = C.
6. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In our numerical simulations, we consider a coalitional
game (I, v) played among N = 4 agents with a set of
agents as I = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Coalitions, including the single-
ton, are assigned with a value specified by characteristic
function v. We set, v({1}) = 4, v({2}) = 3, v({3}) =
0, v({4}) = 3, v({1, 2}) = 5, v({3, 4}) = 3, v({1, 2, 3}) =
7, v(I) = 10. Now, a payoff vector, as in Definition 2, that
belongs to CORE, C in (1) must allocate each agent at-
least its individual value, sum of their allocations should
be vN = 10 and be group rational. Consistent with these
requirements, the CORE of this game is the following set:
C =
{
x ∈ R4 | x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 10,
x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 7, x1 + x2 ≥ 5,
x3 + x4 ≥ 3, x1 ≥ 4, x2 ≥ 3, x3 ≥ 0, x4 ≥ 3
}
.
The agents communicate over time-varying graphs associ-
ated with the adjacency matrices A(k). Here, we set the
adjacency matrices to be:
A(2k + 1) =

1
2
1
2 0 0
1
2
1
2 0 0
0 0 12
1
2
0 0 12
1
2
 , A(2k + 2) =

1
2 0
1
2 0
0 12 0
1
2
1
2 0
1
2 0
0 12 0
1
2
 ,
for all k ∈ N. Note that this graph sequence satisfies
Assumption 1 with Q = 2, and the elements of the
adjacency matrices satisfy Assumption 2 with γ = 1/2.
For the initial assignments, we assume that each agent
allocates entire value of coalition, i.e., v(I) = 10 to
itself. For example, the initial proposal by agent 1 will
be w1(1) = [ 10 0 0 0 ]
>. Finally, we apply the iteration in
(11) with the operator T = (1− β)projC(·) + βQC(·), and
as expected, the local allocations converge to C ∩ A.
In Figure 3(a), we compare the trajectories of normalized
distances dist(w(k), C ∩ A)/dist(w(0), C ∩ A), by varying
β for a specified αk. We can observe that a higher value
of β corresponds to a faster convergence. In Figure 3(b),
we use the same metric and observe the convergence speed
while varying α. As expected, the convergence of iteration
with fixed step size α, is faster compared to a decreasing
sequence (αk)k∈N as in [Bauso and Notarstefano (2015)].
7. CONCLUSION
We presented a partial operator-theoretic characterization
of the approachability principle and showed that it con-
tains a paracontraction operator. Based on this result,
we have proposed a distributed payoff allocation algo-
rithm, with fixed step sizes, and proved its convergence via
operator-theoretic arguments. Such analysis of algorithms,
based on operator theory, allow more general description
of their structure and hence open further improvement
possibilities.
As future work, we aim to completely characterize the
approachability principle in operator-theoretic terms. It
would also be valuable to relax the assumption on the
communication graph from double stochasticity to row
stochasticity.
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